









Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine 
 
First Draft: December, 2002 
This Draft: April 2005 
 
 
Abstract: Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting 
theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and 
banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank 
regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking 
crisis.  Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in 
economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in 
commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic 
conditions, and shocks to the economy.  Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies 
and institutions that thwart competition are associated with greater banking system fragility. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The consolidation of banks around the globe is fueling an active public policy debate on 
the impact of consolidation on financial stability.
1  Indeed, economic theory provides conflicting 
predictions about the relationship between the concentration and the competitiveness of the 
banking industry and banking system fragility.  Motivated by public policy debates and 
ambiguous theoretical predictions, this paper investigates empirically the impact of bank 
concentration and bank regulations on banking system stability.   
Some theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that a less concentrated 
banking sector with many banks is more prone to financial crises than a concentrated banking 
sector with a few banks (Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004).  First, concentrated banking systems may 
enhance market power and boost bank profits.  High profits provide a “buffer” against adverse 
shocks and increase the charter or franchise value of the bank, reducing incentives for bank 
owners and managers to take excessive risk and thus reducing the probability of systemic 
banking distress (Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 2000; Besanko and Thakor, 1993; Boot and 
Greenbaum, 1993, Matutes and Vives, 2000). 
2  Second, some hold that it is substantially easier 
to monitor a few banks in a concentrated banking system than it is to monitor lots of banks in a 
diffuse banking system.  From this perspective, supervision of banks will be more effective and 
the risks of contagion and thus systemic crisis less pronounced in a concentrated banking system.  
According to Allen and Gale (2000), the U.S., with its large number of banks, supports this 
                                                 
1 See Group of Ten (2001), Bank for International Settlements (2001), International Monetary Fund (2001). See 
Carletti and Hartmann (2003) and Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) for an overview of the literature. 
2 Rather than focusing on the links between concentration and the portfolio decisions of banks, Smith (1984) holds 
banks’ asset allocation decisions constant and examines the liquidity side of the balance sheet.  He shows that less 
competition can lead to more stability if information about the probability distribution of depositors’ liquidity needs  2      
“concentration-stability” view since it has had a history of much greater financial instability than 
the U.K or Canada, where the banking sector is dominated by fewer larger banks.
3 
An opposing view is that a more concentrated banking structure enhances bank fragility.  
First, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) argue that the standard argument that market power in banking 
boosts profits and hence bank stability ignores the potential impact of banks’ market power on 
firm behavior.  They confirm that concentrated banking systems enhance market power, which 
allows banks to boost the interest rate they charge to firms.  Boyd and De Nicolo’s (2005) 
theoretical model, however, shows that these higher interest rates may induce firms to assume 
greater risk.  Thus, in many parameterizations of the model, Boyd, and De Nicolo (2005) find a 
positive relationship between concentration and bank fragility and thus the probability of 
systemic distress.  Similarly, Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that less competition can lead to 
less credit rationing, larger loans and higher probability of failure if loans are subject to 
multiplicative uncertainty.   Second, advocates of the “concentration-fragility” view argue that (i) 
relative to diffuse banking systems, concentrated banking systems generally have fewer banks 
and (ii) policymakers are more concerned about bank failures when there are only a few banks.  
                                                                                                                                                             
is private.  Matutes and Vives (1996), however, highlight the complexity of the linkages running from market 
structure, to competition, to bank stability and show that bank fragility can arise in any market structure. 
3 Some proponents of the “concentration-stability” view argue that -- holding other things constant – (i) banks in 
concentrated systems will be larger than banks in more diffuse systems and (ii) larger banks tend to be better 
diversified than smaller banks.  Based on these assumptions, concentrated banking systems with a few large banks 
will be less fragile than banking systems with many small banks.  Models by Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986), Allen (1990), and others predict economies of scale 
in intermediation. As discussed by Calomiris (2000) and Calomiris and Mason (2000), an extensive literature finds 
an inverse relationship between bank scale and bank failure in the United States. However, empirical work by 
Chong (1991) and Hughes and Mester (1998) indicates that bank consolidation tends to increase the riskiness of 
bank portfolios. Boyd and Runkle (1993), examining 122 U.S. bank holding companies, find that there is an inverse 
relationship between size and the volatility of asset returns, but no evidence that large banks are less likely to fail. 
De Nicoló (2000), on the other hand, finds a positive and significant relationship between bank size and the 
probability of failure for banks in the U.S., Japan and several European countries. Further, having larger banks in a 
concentrated banking system could also increase the contagion risk, resulting in a positive link between 
concentration and systemic fragility.   Thus, there are open issues regarding the relationship between bank size and 
bank risk.  Although we explore the sensitivity of our results to controlling for the mean bank size in each country, 
this paper examines the relationship between bank concentration, bank regulations, and crises, not the relationship 
between bank size and diversification.  3      
Based on these assumptions, banks in concentrated systems will tend to receive larger subsidies 
through implicit “too important to fail” policies that intensify risk-taking incentives and hence 
increase banking system fragility (e.g., Mishkin, 1999).
4, 
5  
Despite conflicting theoretical predictions and policy debates, there is no cross-country 
empirical evidence on bank concentration, bank competition and the incidence of systemic 
banking failures.  For the U.S., Keeley (1990) provides evidence that increased competition 
following relaxation of state branching restrictions in the 1980s resulted in an increase in large 
banks’ risk profiles.  Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), on the other hand, find that deregulation in 
the 1980s resulted in lower loan losses, while Dick (2003) finds higher loan loss provisions 
following deregulation in the 1990s. On the cross-country level, De Nicoló et al. (2003) relate 
bank concentration to the fragility of the largest five banks in a country and find a positive 
relationship, suggesting that bank concentration leads to more bank fragility.  They do not 
consider the incidence of systemic banking distress. 
Using data on 69 countries over the period 1980-1997, this paper provides the first cross-
country assessment of the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national 
                                                 
4 There is a literature that examines deposit insurance and its effect on bank decisions.  According to this literature 
(e.g. Merton (1977), Sharpe (1978), Flannery (1989), Kane (1989), Keeley (1990), Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor 
(1992), Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002)) – mis-priced deposit insurance produces an 
incentive for banks to take risk.  If the regulatory treatment were the same for insured banks of all sizes, these 
models would predict no relationship between bank size and riskiness.  Since regulators fear potential 
macroeconomic consequences of large bank failures, most countries have implicit “too large to fail” policies which 
protect all liabilities of very large banks whether they are insured or not.  Thus, the largest banks frequently receive 
a greater net subsidy from the government (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).  Even in the absence of deposit insurance, 
banks are prone to excessive risk-taking due to limited liability for their equity holders and to their high leverage 
(Stiglitz, 1972).  This subsidy may in turn increase the risk-taking incentives of the larger banks. For an analysis of 
the corporate governance of banks, see Macey and O’Hara (2003). 
5 Proponents of the concentration-fragility view would also disagree with the proposition that a concentrated 
banking system characterized by a few banks is easier to monitor than a less concentrated banking system with 
many banks.  The countervailing argument is as follows.  Bank size is positively correlated with complexity so that 
large banks are harder to monitor than small banks.  Holding all other features of the economy constant, 
concentrated banking systems tend to have larger banks.  Thus, this argument predicts a positive relationship 
between concentration and fragility.  Again, this paper focuses on the aggregate relationship between bank 
concentration and crises.  Although we control for bank size in our regressions, we do not examine the linkages 
between bank size and the ease of monitoring.  4      
institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis.
6  While defined 
more rigorously below, a systemic banking crisis refers to an episode when the entire national 
banking system has suffered sufficient losses such that non-performing loans exceed ten percent 
of total banking system assets, or when the government has taken extraordinary steps, such as 
declaring a bank holiday or nationalizing much of the banking system.  Besides the relationship 
between systemic banking crises and concentration, we also examine international differences in 
bank capital regulations, rules restricting bank entry, regulatory restrictions on bank activities, 
and the overall institutional environment.  While we use cross-country differences in these bank 
regulations and institutions to assess the robustness of the relationship between concentration and 
crises, the results on regulations and institutions are independently valuable.  Specifically, we 
provide empirical evidence on which regulations and institutions are associated with bank 
stability.   
The bulk of the evidence indicates that crises are less likely in more concentrated banking 
systems, which supports the concentration-stability view.  The negative relationship between 
concentration and crises holds when conditioning on macroeconomic, financial, regulatory, 
institutional, and cultural characteristics and is robust to an array of sensitivity checks.  The data 
never support the concentration-fragility view.  Furthermore, our analyses suggest that the 
relationship between concentration and crises is not driven by reverse causality.  While we 
cannot confirm or reject these results when restricting our sample to the high-income countries – 
                                                 
6 Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) investigate the impact of bank concentration and regulations on bank 
net interest margins, but they do not examine bank fragility. Earlier work on systemic banking instability has mostly 
focused on identifying (i) the macroeconomic determinants of banking crises (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, et al., 1997; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, henceforth DD), (ii) the relationship between banking and currency crises 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), (iii) the impact of financial liberalization on bank stability (DD, 1999), and (iv) the 
impact of deposit insurance design on bank fragility (DD, 2002).  Barth et al. (2004) examine the relationship 
between bank regulations and crises, but they do not examine bank concentration.  5      
not surprising given the limited number of countries and crises – our findings hold for the sub-
sample of developing countries. 
The data also indicate that (i) fewer regulatory restrictions on banks – lower barriers to 
bank entry and fewer restrictions on bank activities – reduce banking system fragility, and (ii) 
countries with national institutions that facilitate competition in general have a lower likelihood 
of suffering a systemic banking crisis.  Thus, more competitive banking systems are associated 
with less banking system fragility.  In terms of linking the results back to specific parts of the 
concentration-stability view, the finding that competition reduces fragility when controlling for 
concentration suggests that something else besides a positive relationship between bank 
concentration and bank profits drives the negative relationship between bank concentration and 
banking system fragility. Our results also suggest that concentration might be an insufficient 
measure of the competitiveness of the banking system.
7 
Given that this is an initial study of bank concentration and crises, these results must be 
qualified along a number of dimensions.  First, we investigate systemic banking crises, which are 
very difficult to define and date.  Consequently, we use different definitions of and dates for 
crises and obtain robust results.  Nevertheless, future work that assesses the impact of the market 
structure of the banking industry and bank regulations on individual bank fragility will provide a 
valuable complement to and extension of our research.  Second, in some specifications, we 
examine cross-country differences in bank regulatory policies and national institutions to (i) 
assess the robustness of the concentration-fragility relationship and (ii) provide information on 
the links between bank regulations, national institutions, and banking system crises.  We are 
cautious about these results, however, because the regulatory and institutional indicators are 
                                                 
7 See also Claessens and Laeven (2004) who do not find any evidence for a negative relationship between bank 
concentration and a measure of bank competitiveness calculated from marginal bank behavior.  6      
measured toward the end of the sample period.  Thus, the regulatory and institutional variables 
are measured after some of the crises.  This timing problem does not affect our primary results 
on bank concentration because the same results hold when these regulatory variables are 
excluded.  Furthermore, some existing research that we review below finds that, except in a few 
countries, regulatory policies and national institutions have, in general, changed little over the 
last couple of decades.  Nevertheless, future work that focuses on bank-level fragility while using 
detailed data on bank regulations and institutions will further contribute to our understanding of 
the determinants of banking crises.  Third, this paper provides evidence that is consistent with 
concentration-stability theories, but inconsistent with models that emphasize the concentration-
fragility view.  Nonetheless, the empirical work does not explain exactly why concentration 
increases banking system stability.  Future work needs to more fully dissect the channels through 
which concentration influences bank stability.  Finally, while policy-relevant, this research 
provides an initial assessment of whether concentration is positively or negatively associated 
with crises and should not be taken as a recommendation for greater bank concentration.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data set and 
presents summary statistics. Section III explains the methodology used in empirical tests.  
Section IV contains the main results and Section V concludes.  7      
 
II.  Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Our sample covers the period 1980-1997.
8 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 
whole sample.
9  
Crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if the country is going through a systemic 
crisis and zero if it is not.  We use the Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002, henceforth DD) 
dating of systemic banking crises, referring to periods where the national banking system is in 
such distress that it is not capable of fulfilling any meaningful intermediation role for the 
economy.  Using country-specific data on individual bank failures and reports by national 
supervisory agencies, along with data collected by Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) and Caprio 
and Klingebiel (1999), DD (2002) define systemic banking crises as occurring when emergency 
measures were taken to assist the banking system (such as bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket 
guarantees to depositors or other bank creditors), or if large-scale nationalizations took place.  
DD (2002) also classify a country as experiencing a systemic banking crisis if non-performing 
assets reached at least 10 percent of total assets at the peak of the crisis, or if the fiscal cost of the 
rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP.  Many crises run for multiple years.  Following 
DD (2002), we exclude years classified as crisis years after the initial year of the crisis because 
during a crisis, the behavior of some of the explanatory variables is likely to be affected by the 
crisis itself.  Note, however, that including all of the crisis years does not change the conclusions, 
as we demonstrate in the tables below.  For the period 1980-1997, our sample includes 69 
countries and 47 crisis episodes.    Besides using this definition of systemic crises, which has 
                                                 
8 The data include the East Asian crises, but are robust to their exclusion. 
9 Appendix Tables 1 and 3 (i) provide data sources, (ii) present country data on GDP per capita, concentration, crisis 
periods, and (iii) define the rationale for classifying each crisis as a systemic banking crisis. Appendix Table 2 
presents separate statistics for crisis- and non-crisis observations.  These tables are available on request.  8      
been employed by recently published papers (DD, 1998, 2002; Barth et al, 2004, 2005), we 
provide robustness tests using alternative definitions of “systemic crises.”
10  
Concentration equals the share of assets of the three largest banks in total banking system 
assets.
11  We compute a measure of bank concentration using the Bankscope database compiled 
by Fitch-IBCA, which reports bank balance sheet data in a large cross-section of countries 
beginning in 1988.  Since the sample of banks covered in Bankscope increased over the sample 
period, changes in the concentration measure could reflect changes in coverage. To reduce biases 
stemming from the coverage problem, we average the concentration measure over the period 
1988-1997.  Moreover, other information suggests that changes in Bankscope coverage do not 
influence our results because we obtain the same results using (i) annual concentration values, 
(ii) concentration from Bankscope measured at the beginning of the sample period, and (iii) 
different measures of concentration.  Furthermore, by confirming our results using the initial 
level of concentration at the start of the sample period, we reduce reverse causality concerns.   
As reported in Table 1, there is wide cross-country variation in the sample, with 
concentration levels ranging from less than 20 percent for the U.S. to 100 percent for many 
African countries, with a sample mean of 71%.  
We control for many factors.  Specifically, we begin with the econometric specification 
in DD (2002) and include the same regressors.  Thus, we include the rate of growth of real GDP, 
the change in the external terms of trade, and the rate of inflation, to capture macroeconomic 
developments that are likely to affect the quality of bank assets.  The short-term real interest rate 
                                                 
10 While recognizing that there is no single, unanimous definition of a systemic banking crisis, the primary goal of 
this paper is to provide the first cross-country assessment of the relationship between bank concentration and crises.  
Thus, we assess this link using different definitions of both crises and concentration.   
11 Defining the economy as the relevant banking market abstracts from the fact that in some developed countries, 
such as the United States, the relevant banking market is sub-national. Below, we control for this fact by testing the 
robustness of our results to dropping developed economies.  9      
is included to capture the banks’ cost of funds.  Also, higher real interest rates may affect bank 
profitability increasing default rates.  The vulnerability of the banking system to sudden capital 
outflows triggered by foreign exchange risk is measured by the rate of exchange rate 
depreciation and by the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves.  Lagged credit growth is also a 
control since high rates of credit expansion may finance an asset price bubble that may cause a 
crisis when it bursts.  We also include DD’s (2002) index of moral hazard caused by deposit 
insurance generosity since they find that it contributes significantly to financial fragility.
12  
Finally, GDP per capita is used to control for the level of development of the country.  Table 1 
shows a wide variation in the control variables across countries and over time. Our preliminary 
analyses show that countries in crisis grow more slowly, experience negative terms of trade 
shocks, and have both higher inflation and deprecation rates than countries not in crisis.
13  
We also augment the benchmark specification in DD by using measures of bank 
regulation, the competitiveness of the banking system and the economy in general, and a 
summary institutional index. Including these measures allows us to test for the direct effect of 
competitiveness on systemic crisis probability, controlling for banking sector concentration.  
Measures of bank regulation come from Barth et al., (2001, 2004, 2005).  The data set is 
collected through surveys of government officials in the late 1990s.  There is some evidence, 
however, that regulatory policies have not changed much in most countries.  For instance, Barth 
et al. (2001) show that the regulatory restrictions on bank activities did not change much 
following systemic crises.  Moreover, in the few cases when they did change, there was a change 
                                                 
12 To build an aggregate index of moral hazard, DD (2002) estimate the first principal component of various deposit 
insurance design features.  Specifically, they use coinsurance, coverage of foreign currency and interbank deposits, 
type of funding, source of funding, management, membership, and the level of explicit coverage to create this 
aggregate index that increases with the generosity of the deposit insurance regime. The index varies over time since 
different countries adopted deposit insurance or revised its design features at different points in time. 
13 See Appendix Table 2, available on request.  10     
toward fewer regulatory restrictions.  Thus, the timing of the Barth et al. (2001) data actually 
biases the results against finding a positive relationship between regulatory restrictions on bank 
activities and the likelihood of suffering a systemic crisis.
14   
We use four measures of bank regulation.   
Fraction of Entry Denied is the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the 
number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities. This is a measure of entry 
restrictions in banking and thus the contestability of the market. To the extent restricted entry 
increases bank profits, this variable would be associated with less fragility. If however, restricted 
entry induces inefficiencies in the banking market, it could also lead to greater fragility.   
Activity Restrictions aggregates measures that indicate whether bank activities in the 
securities, insurance, and real estate markets and ownership and control of nonfinancial firms are 
(1) unrestricted, (2) permitted, (3) restricted, or (4) prohibited.  The aggregate indicator has 
therefore a possible maximum variation between four and 16, with higher numbers indicating 
more restrictions on bank activities and nonfinancial ownership and control. If these restrictions 
keep banks from entering excessively risky lines of business, then they may foster banking 
system stability.  If however, restrictions prevent firms from diversifying outside their traditional 
lines of business, they may increase the fragility of the system.   
Required Reserves is the ratio of bank assets that regulators require banks to hold as 
reserves.  Banking systems with higher ratios of required reserves may be more stable since they 
would have a greater buffer to absorb liquidity shocks.  However, greater required reserves are 
also a tax on the banking system, which may lower profits and raise fragility. 
                                                 
14 Carkovic and Levine (2002) show that the bank regulations in Chile changed very little in the 1990s..  11     
Capital Regulatory Index is a summary measure of capital stringency and is given by the 
sum of initial capital stringency and overall capital requirements. To the extent that book capital 
is an accurate measure of bank solvency we expect better capitalized banks to be less fragile.    
We also use three additional variables to capture the extent of banking freedom and 
general economic freedom and the institutional environment.   
Banking Freedom is an indicator of the openness of the banking system.  It is a composite 
index of whether foreign banks are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open domestic 
banks, how degree of regulation of financial market activities, the presence of state-owned 
banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to 
provide customers with insurance products and invest in securities.  Higher values indicate fewer 
restrictions on banking freedoms.   On the one hand, fewer official impediments to bank 
operations and entry could stimulate efficiency and diversification that promotes stability.  On 
the other hand, greater banking freedom could induce destabilizing competition.   
Economic Freedom is an indicator of how a country’s policies rank in terms of providing 
economic freedoms.  It is a composite of ten indicators ranking policies in the areas of trade, 
government finances, government interventions, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign 
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market 
activity.  Higher scores indicate polices more conducive to competition and economic freedom.    
To the extent freedoms allow banks to improve efficiency and to engage in different activities 
and diversify their risks, we expect increased level of freedoms to reduce fragility.  However, 
greater freedoms also allow banks to undertake greater risks, particularly if existing regulations 
distort risk-taking incentives.  Thus, overall greater freedom may also lead to greater bank  12     
fragility.  Both Banking and Economic Freedom are available from the Heritage Foundation, are 
built on expert opinions, and are average values for the period 1995-97. 
KKZ_Composite is an index of the overall level of institutional development constructed 
by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  The underlying indicators are voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption.  This index is available for 1998.  We expect better institutions to lead to 
reduced bank fragility, controlling for all other factors.  
Finally, we control for other national characteristics that the literature has identified as 
being closely linked to financial sector development.  Specifically, we control for whether the 
country has a British, French German, or Scandinavian Legal Origin because La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003), and others find that legal origin 
explains cross-country differences in financial development.  We control for legal origin by 
including dummy variables that take on the value one for the respective legal tradition. We 
capture the Scandinavian legal origin in the constant. Catholic, Protestant and Muslim are the 
shares of the respective religion in each country, with the constant capturing other religions. 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) find that Protestant countries have stronger creditor right 
protection. We also use the absolute value of a country’s Latitude, since Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) show that endowments influence institutional and financial 
development. Finally, we control for Ethnic Fractionalization, since Easterly and Levine (1997) 
show that ethnic diversity tends to reduce the provision of public goods, including the 
institutions that support the contracting environment.    13     
 
III. Methodology 
To test whether bank concentration and competition affect banking system fragility, we 
follow DD (1998, 2002) and use a logit probability model that is robust to heteroskedasticity.
 15  
We estimate the probability that a systemic crisis will occur at a particular time in a particular 
country, assuming that this probability is a function of the explanatory variables (X(i,t)).  Let P(i, 
t) denote a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a banking crisis occurs in country i 
and time t and a value of zero otherwise. β is a vector of n unknown coefficients and F(β’X(i, t)) 
is the cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at β’X(i, t).
16  Then, the log-
likelihood function of the model is: 
Ln L =  ∑t=1..T ∑i=1..n{P(i,t)ln[F(β’X(i,t))] + (1-P(i,t)) ln[1- F(β’X(i,t))]}. 
While the sign of the estimated coefficient for each explanatory variable indicates 
whether an increase of that explanatory variable increases or decreases the probability of a crisis, 
the estimated coefficients do not indicate the magnitude of the impact of a marginal change in 
the explanatory variable on the probability of a crisis.  Instead, the coefficients reflect the effect 
of a change in an explanatory variable on ln(P(i,t)/(1-P(i,t))), so that the magnitude of the impact 
on the probability of a crisis depends on the slope of the cumulative distribution function at 
β ’X(i,t).  Therefore, the magnitude of the change in the probability of a crisis depends on the 
initial values of all the independent variables and their coefficients.  Thus, in the analyses below, 
we present marginal coefficient estimates that are computed at the sample mean.  These 
                                                 
15 Also see Cole and Gunther (1995), Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997), and Demirguc-Kunt (1989). 
16 Since observations within each country group may also be correlated, we relax the assumption that errors are 
independent within country observations.  We present these robustness tests below.  14     
estimates illustrate the economic magnitudes of the relationship between each explanatory 
variable and the probability of a systemic banking crisis evaluated at the sample mean. 
  
IV.  Results 
 
A.  Main findings 
In Table 2, banking system concentration enters all of the regressions negatively and 
significantly.  Regression (1) presents the results when including the standard explanatory 
variables; regression (2) adds concentration.
17  Concentration enters with a significant negative 
coefficient throughout.  In columns (3) and (4), we test the sensitivity of our findings to the 
treatment of crisis observations after the initial year of the crisis. In column (3), we include all 
the crisis period observations.
18  In column (4), we weight the crisis observations by the length of 
the crisis.  In both cases, our finding of a negative and significant relationship between bank 
concentration and crisis probability is confirmed.  These analyses lend no support to the view 
that concentration induces banking system instability.  Rather, the results suggest that 
concentrated banking systems are less vulnerable to banking crises. 
                                                 
17 We also ran the column (2) regression without GDP per capita and obtain very similar results on concentration. 
18 When we included subsequent crisis years as non-crisis observations, the results on concentration are similar.  15     
The Table 2 estimates also suggest that the economic impact is large.  Regression (2) 
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in concentration (0.2) leads to a decrease in the 
probability of a crisis of one percent (-0.01=0.2*-0.05).
 Since crisis probabilities at any point in 
time are quite low (five percent), this is a substantial reduction. When including the subsequent 
crisis years in the analyses, the estimated effect of a one standard deviation in bank concentration 
leads to a reduction in the predicted probability of a crisis of 3.5 percent, compared to a sample 
mean of 18 percent for the sample that includes the years of the crisis. This result is supportive of 
the concentration-stability view that concentration fosters a more stable banking system.  
Among the control variables, GDP growth and per capita GDP enter negatively, while the 
real interest rates enter positively, as suggested by economic theory and earlier empirical studies.  
While moral hazard enters positively and significantly in column (1), indicating that deposit 
insurance design influences banking system stability, it loses significance in some specifications 
when controlling for bank concentration. A strong negative correlation between concentration 
and moral hazard might explain the loss of significance of moral hazard.  We view the fit of the 
model as satisfactory given the difficulty in modeling systemic crises. The benchmark 
specification with concentration classifies 66 percent of all observations and 73 percent of crisis 
observations accurately (column 2).
19  Pseudo R-squares range from 6% to 11% depending on 
the specification.  The mean predicted probability for crisis observations is 12%, whereas it is 
4% for non-crisis observations.  The estimated crisis probability increases prior to the crisis, and 
the mean for three years prior to crisis is 5%.  
To check for a non-linear relationship between concentration and crises, we run a piece-
wise regression, where concentration is broken into quintiles (Table 2, column 5).  We create  16     
five concentration quintile dummies that equal one if the value of concentration falls within that 
quintile and zero otherwise.  Thus, each observation in the regression has five concentration 
variables.  We multiply the concentration variable by each of the concentration quintile dummy 
variables, so that four of these equal zero for each observation.  The results indicate that the 
stabilizing effect of concentration is significant for all but the lowest concentration quintile. The 
coefficient size decreases at higher levels of concentration, but remains negative. The regression 
(5) results indicate that there is a statistically significant, negative relationship between 
concentration and banking system fragility for levels of concentration above 35 percent.  
 
B.  Sensitivity analyses 
In Table 3, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to using different definitions of a 
systemic crisis, controlling for reverse causation, employing alternative definitions of banking 
system concentration, estimating alternative econometric specifications and using alternative 
samples. In column (1), we change the crisis definition to the one used by Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1999).
20 This crisis definition blurs the distinctions between crisis and non-crisis observations, 
as it includes borderline crises.  Nevertheless, we use this alternative definition as a robustness 
check. The concentration result remains essentially unchanged, negative and significant at ten 
percent.  In column (2) we report results with a different crisis definition where systemic crisis 
definition excludes the NPL criteria (NPL>10%) and reclassifies these “former” crisis countries 
as non-crisis countries.  This change leaves the results unchanged.  In unreported regressions, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 In classifying observations, predicted probabilities significantly higher than five percent (number of crisis 
observations divided by total number of observations which equals the sample mean of the crisis dummy) are 
classified as crisis observations and those below five percent are classified as no crisis. 
20 Portugal and Guyana are re-defined as non-crisis countries and the following crises are added to the sample: 
Burundi (1994-97), Canada (1983-85), Congo (1992-97), Denmark (1987-92), and France (1994-95).  17     
also tried excluding these countries from the estimation, which does not affect the significance 
level of the concentration variable.
21      
Robustness tests indicate that the results are not driven by reverse causality.  Reverse 
causality could arise if systemic crises led to lower levels of concentration in the banking system 
through greater entry or changes in general competition policies.  Although we check the 
robustness of the results, it is important to reiterate why we use average concentration over the 
period 1988-1997 for the bulk of the analyses rather than using annual observations.  The sample 
of banks covered by Bankscope changes over the sample period.  Thus, measured changes in 
concentration when using annual data may reflect changes in coverage, not changes in actual 
concentration.  Therefore, using annual data will induce an errors in variables problem that 
biases the results toward finding an insignificant relationship.  Nevertheless, we undertake the 
following sensitivity analyses.  First, we inspect individual crisis cases in our sample.  We do not 
see a significant pattern of reduced concentration after crisis episodes, and indeed the data 
suggest that concentration generally varies little over time.  Second, we estimate a specification 
using the initial level of concentration (1988 or the first available year in the data) instead of the 
1988-97 average.  Table 3 regression (3) shows that this does not change our results 
significantly: concentration is negatively associated with the likelihood of suffering a crisis.
22     
As additional robustness checks, we use the Herfindahl index of concentration, which is 
the sum of the squared market shares. Given that our sample size changes over the sample 
period, including banks beyond the top three might introduce measurement bias.  For this 
                                                 
21 In unreported regressions, we also excluded from the systemic crisis definition NPL as well crisis cost criteria 
(crisis costs >2 % of GDP) and re-classified all these observations as non-crisis observations; the coefficient on 
concentration is still negative and significant at the six percent level. 
22 Since some of the crisis episodes occur before the date beginning date of data on concentration, we re-ran the 
regression without those crisis episodes that precede the initial concentration date.  This leaves us with only 20 crisis 
episodes and less than half of the total number of observations, yet the concentration variable still remains negative 
and significant. We also confirm our results using annual data.  18     
reasons, we favor the three-bank concentration indicator, which equals the share of assets of the 
three largest banks relative to total banking system assets.  Nevertheless, the result using the 
Herfindahl index for all available banks indicates a negative and significant (at the ten percent 
level) relationship between concentration and crises (column 4).
 23   
Thus far, we have allowed for heteroskedasticity of errors and corrected for it, but 
assumed that the errors are independent.  Given that we use a panel data set, the error terms 
within individual countries may be correlated with each other.  To control for the fact that 
omitted country-level characteristics might cause correlation of the error terms within countries, 
Table 3, column (5) reports results that allow for clustering within countries.  Specifically, we 
require that error terms are independent across countries but not necessarily within countries. 
Concentration still enters with a negative and significant coefficient.
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We also investigate the sensitivity of our results to using alternative samples. In column 
(6) of Table 3, we exclude all countries with populations of less than 20 million.
25  In column 
(7), we exclude G-10 countries.  In both cases, we continue to find a negative relationship 
between crises and concentration. 
27 Running the regression with only G-10 or high-income 
countries yields a negative but insignificant relationship between concentration and crisis, which 
can be explained by (i) the low number of crises in developed countries over the sample period, 
                                                 
23 We also use a survey-based measure of concentration from the Barth et al.  (2004) database, which defines bank 
concentration as the share of deposits of the largest five banks.  The correlation between the concentration measures 
calculated from Bankscope data and from Barth et al. is 52%, significant at the 1%-level.  Using this measure 
reduces our sample greatly, but still yields a negative coefficient, significant at the 13% level. 
24 We also estimated a logit model with random country effects.  Again, the results are not significantly different and 
we cannot reject the Hausman null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients estimated using random country 
errors and those using fixed effects estimations are not systematic. 
25 Eliminating countries with less than 1 million or less than 10 million inhabitants yielded similar results. Excluding 
African countries, which tend to have very high bank concentration ratios, does not change our results either.  
27We also tested the sensitivity of our findings to outliers. Specifically, we excluded Cote d’Ivoire (1993) because 
their M2/reserves values are outliers and Peru (1991) because its inflation and real interest rate values are outliers.  
Our findings are confirmed.  Further, when we lag all observations by one period, our results are again confirmed.  19     
and (ii) the fact that the rich country sample is much smaller.  We can thus neither confirm nor 
reject our findings for the high-income sub-sample. 
Finally, we control for Bank Size, which equals total banking system assets divided by 
the number of banks in billions of US$. If concentration is simply proxying for the average size 
of banks in a country, then including Bank Size will drive out the significance of concentration.  
Regression (8), however, indicates that concentration continues to enter negatively and 
significantly when controlling for Bank Size, but Bank Size does not enter significantly.    
 
C. Concentration, regulations, institutions, and crises 
In Table 4, we control for different bank regulations and the institutional environment.
28  
We include indicators of bank regulations for three reasons.  First, controlling for differences in 
national policies provides a simple robustness test of the relationship between concentration and 
crises.  Second, controlling for regulations provides additional information on the concentration-
fragility relationship.  If concentration is proxying for regulations that impede competition, then 
controlling for the regulatory environment will drive out the significance of concentration in the 
crisis regression and therefore explain why we find a significant, negative coefficient on 
concentration.  Finally, examining the relationship between bank regulations and banking system 
stability is independently valuable.  Countries implement regulations to promote banking system 
stability.  This research provides some information about which policies work.
29   
                                                 
28 We also controlled for public and foreign ownership.  While we cannot find a robust relationship between the 
ownership structure and banking system stability, controlling for the ownership structure does not affect our main 
finding of a negative relationship between concentration and crisis probability. 
29 These specifications exclude GDP per capita since it is also a proxy for the overall institutional environment, 
including bank regulations.  We have also estimated specifications where we have left out the concentration variable 
and included only the regulation.  The results are virtually unchanged.    20     
The Table 4 results indicate that the negative relationship between banking system 
concentration and the probability of suffering a systemic banking crisis holds even when 
including measures of the regulatory environment, the general openness of the banking industry, 
the degree of economic freedom in the economy, and a general index of institutional 
development.
 30  When controlling for capital regulations, reserve requirements, banking 
freedom, economic freedom and a summary measure of institutional development, concentration 
enters negative and significantly at the five percent level.  When controlling for the fraction of 
entry applications denied and regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, concentration 
enters negatively and significantly at the ten percent level.
31   
The Table 4 results also indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more severe regulatory 
restrictions on bank activities boost bank fragility.  These are consistent with the results obtained 
by Barth et al. (2004), who examine the impact of entry restrictions on crises in a purely cross-
country investigation that does not control for bank concentration.  A higher fraction of entry 
applications denied - a proxy for tighter entry regulations – leads to higher levels of fragility in 
the banking system.  This is consistent with the argument that restricted entry reduces the 
efficiency of the banking system, also making it more vulnerable to external shocks.  Similarly, 
we find that restrictions on bank activities increase crisis probabilities.  This result indicates that 
overall these restrictions prevent banks from diversifying outside their traditional business, 
reducing their ability to reduce the riskiness of their portfolios.  The required reserves and capital 
regulatory index do not enter with significant coefficients.
 32   
                                                 
30 Bank concentration remains significantly, negatively associated with bank fragility even when simultaneously 
controlling for the regulatory variables and the institutional development indicators, but the intersection of these 
regulatory and institutional variables cuts the number of observations virtually in half.   
31 In unreported regressions we have also explored specifications where we have interacted the concentration 
variable with these regulatory and institutional variables, but the interaction terms did not enter significantly. 
32 Including all the regulatory variables simultaneously (i) does not change the results on concentration and (ii) does 
not yield significant coefficients on the regulatory variables because they are highly correlated with each other. The  21     
The variables that capture the general openness and competitiveness of the banking 
system and the economy enter with negative and very significant coefficients (Table 4 
regressions 5-7).  Thus countries with greater freedoms in banking and generally more 
competitive economic policies are less likely to experience banking crises.  This is the case 
despite the fact that these policies also tend to reduce entry barriers and are correlated with 
reduced levels of bank concentration.  A better institutional environment is also associated with a 
lower probability of systemic crisis, as expected.  In regression (8), we include two of the 
institutional indicators simultaneously.  As shown, there is multicollinearity across the different 
institutional variables (though they jointly enter significantly).  Even when simultaneously 
including these controls, however, concentration enters negatively and significantly.  The 
evidence is consistent with theories that emphasize the stabilizing effects of competition, but 
inconsistent with the many models that stress the destabilizing effects from competition. 
In Table 5, we explore the linkages between systemic banking crises and concentration 
while controlling for other national characteristics that may explain institutional development, 
such as legal origin, religious composition, geography, and ethnic diversity.  The negative 
relationship between banking system concentration and systemic crises remains negative and 
significant even when controlling for these other factors. 
The findings that (i) concentration lowers banking system fragility and (ii) low 
competition raises banking system fragility imply that future research needs to move beyond a 
simple “concentration-stability” versus “concentration-fragility” debate where concentration is 
viewed as a simple proxy for market power.  More specifically, one standard view holds that 
                                                                                                                                                             
only specification in which the relationship between concentration and systemic crisis probability turns insignificant 
is the one where all explanatory variables are included at the same time and where endogeneity problems are 
circumvented by focusing on initial crisis years and by lagging the explanatory variables. We conjecture that this  22     
concentrated banking systems reduce banking system fragility by boosting the profits of banks.  
Recall, however, that this paper finds that (i) concentration remains negatively associated with 
banking system fragility when controlling for regulations and institutions associated with 
competition and (ii) these indicators of competition are associated with greater banking system 
stability.  If our regulatory and institutional indicators do a reasonably good job of measuring the 
competitiveness of the banking industry, then these results (i) are inconsistent with the argument 
that concentration enhances stability by boosting the market power of banks and (ii) indicate that 
concentration is measuring “something else” besides market power.  We hope that future studies 
at the individual bank-level can identify why bank concentration is negatively correlated with 
bank fragility even after controlling for the degree of competition in the banking industry.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the impact of bank concentration on banking system fragility.  We 
use cross-country data on 69 countries and 47 crisis episodes.  The paper conducts an array of 
sensitivity analyses that extend the core results.   
The results are consistent with concentration-stability theories but are inconsistent with 
the concentration-fragility views.  These initial analyses indicate that national bank concentration 
tends to reduce the likelihood that a country will suffer a systemic banking crisis.  The results 
hold when controlling for a wide array of macroeconomic, regulatory and institutional factors, 
when using different definitions of crises and concentration, and after examining different sub-
samples of countries. While we cannot confirm or reject these results when restricting our 
                                                                                                                                                             
outlier result can be explained by the substantially lower number of observations and with multicollinearity between 
many of the explanatory variables.  23     
sample to the high-income countries – not surprising given the limited number of countries and 
crises – our findings hold for the sub-sample of developing countries. 
In terms of regulations and institutions, the data do not support the view that more 
competition increases fragility.  Quite to the contrary, the results indicate that banking systems 
where a larger fraction of entry applications are denied, and those where regulations restrict 
banks from engaging in non-loan making activities have a greater likelihood of experiencing a 
systemic crisis.  Similarly, in terms of national institutions, the regressions indicate that countries 
with better-developed institutions that foster competition are less likely to suffer systemic 
banking crises.  The finding that both concentration and competitiveness of the banking system 
is positively related to banking stability suggests that bank concentration is an insufficient 
measure of bank competitiveness. 
While our paper shows that more concentrated banking systems are less likely to suffer 
systemic crises, we do not explore the mechanisms.  While policy-relevant, our findings should 
therefore not be seen as a recommendation for policymakers to foster bank concentration.  Future 
research has to examine the channels through which concentration and the competitiveness of the 
financial system impact stability.   
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics  
 
Banking crisis is a crisis dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth 
is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Terms of trade equals the change in the terms of trade of goods and services.  Real interest rate 
is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  
M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  
Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with 
varying deposit insurance schemes.  Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each 
country, averaged over the sample period.  Fraction of entry applications denied is the number of entry applications denied as a 
fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities.  Activity restrictions measures the degree to 
which a bank is restricted from engaging in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and from real 
estate investment, management, and development.  Required reserves is the percentage of reserves regulators require banks to 
hold.  Capital regulatory index measures capital stringency in the banking system.  Banking freedom is an indicator of the relative 
openness of the banking system.  Economic freedom is a composite measure of institutional factors determining economic 
freedom.  KKZ_composite is a composite measure of governance indicators. Legal origin includes the three dummies UK, France 
and Germany, which take the value 1 for each legal origin respectively.  Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of each 
country normalized to lie between zero and one.  Religion includes three variables, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, which indicate 
the percentage of the population that follows a particular religion.  Ethnic Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly 
selected individuals in a country will not speak the same language.   Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the 
data appendix, available on request. 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean St.  Dev.  Maximum  Minimum 
Banking crisis  1138  0.05  0.21  0  1 
Growth 1138  3.30  4.24  -16.40  23.60 
Terms of trade change  1138  0.17  10.03  -51.45  63.24 
Real interest rate  1138  -5.39  185.00  -5845.19  192.90 
Inflation 1138  23.37  203.18  -29.17  6134.79 
M2/reserves 1138  23.51  81.30  0.19  1372.94 
Depreciation  1138 0.11 0.27 -0.35 4.26 
Credit Growtht-2 1138  6.12  15.66  -54.62  115.42 
Real GDP per capita  1138  8282.29  10638.37  148.18  45950.46 
Moral  hazard  1138 -0.87 2.36 -2.49 3.98 
Concentration 69  0.71  0.22  0.19  1 
Fraction of entry applications 
denied 41  0.20  0.28  0  1 
Activity restrictions  53  9.38  2.55  4  14 
Required reserves  41  11.81  11.67  0  43 
Capital regulatory index  52  5.52  1.69  2  8 
Banking freedom  67  3.37  0.85  2  5 
Economic freedom  67  3.21  0.61  1.9  4.5 
KKZ_composite  69  0.32 0.81 -1.03 1.72 
British Legal Origin  69  0.39  0.49  0  1 
French Legal Origin  69  0.48  0.50  0  1 
German Legal Origin  69  0.07  0.26  0  1 
Latitude 69  0.29  0.20  0.01  0.71 
Catholic  69  36.08  36.88 0 96.60 
Muslim  69  15.00  28.27 0 99.40 
Protestant  69  16.36  24.00 -1.53E-06 97.80 
Ethnic  Fractionalization  68  0.32  0.30 0 0.86 
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Table 2.  Banking Crisis and Concentration 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α  + β 1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β 2 Terms of trade changej,t + 
β 3 Real interest ratej,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5M2/reservesj,t + β 6Depreciationj,t  + β 7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β 8 Real GDP per capitaj,t+β 9 
Moral Hazard Indexj,t+β 10 Concentrationj,t+ ε j,t. The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is 
a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Terms of trade equals the changes in the 
terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  
Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the 
real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an 
aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is calculated as the fraction of 
assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the Bankscope 
database of Fitch IBCA. Specifications (1) and (2) exclude crisis observations after the initial crisis year. Specification (3) 
includes the crisis period as crisis observations.  Specification (4) weights crisis years by duration of crisis.  In specification (5), 
we run piece-wise regressions where concentration is split into quintiles and entered 5 times, each time multiplied by a dummy 
that takes the value 1 for each quintile. We present the marginal effects (dy/dx) of the logit regressions.  White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the 
data appendix, available on request. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real  GDP  growth  -0.0052*** -0.0053*** -0.0121*** -0.0201*** -0.0048*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0010) 
Terms of trade change  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0011  -0.0027***  -0.0003 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0003) 
Real interest rate  0.0003**  0.0003**  0.0007**  0.0013***  0.0005*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001) 
Inflation 0.0003  0.0003  0.0007**  0.0022***  0.0003 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
M2/reserves 0.0000  0.0001  0.0003**  0.0003**  0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Depreciation 0.0191  0.0138  0.0832  -0.1537*  0.0200 
  (0.0368) (0.0362) (0.0570) (0.0810) (0.0320) 
Credit Growtht-2  0.0004  0.0004  0.0001 0.0024*** 0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0003) 
Real GDP per capita  -1.39e-06**  -1.45e-06**  -4.87e-06***  -4.85e-06***  -1.60e-06** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Moral Hazard Index  0.0050**  0.0032  0.0166***  0.0156***  0.0040* 
  (-0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0022) 
Concentration   -0.0517**  -0.1591***  -0.1527***   
    (0.0251) (0.0562) (0.0500)   
Concentration*Quint1       -0.2432 
       (0.1541) 
Concentration*Quint2       -0.2427** 
       (0.0983) 
Concentration*Quint3       -0.1929*** 
       (0.0674) 
Concentration*Quint4       -0.1776*** 
       (0.0551) 
Concentration*Quint5       -0.1170*** 
       (0.0447) 
No. of Crises  47  47  196  200  47 
No. of Observations  989  989  1138  1142  989 
%  crises correct  61  66  61  65  66 
%    correct  73 73 65 69 73 
Pseudo R
2  0.0942 0.1135 0.0856 0.0622 0.1474 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.  Banking Crisis, Regulations, Institutions, and Concentration 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t)= α  + β 1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β 2 Terms of trade changej,t + 
β 3 Real interest ratej,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5M2/reservesj,t + β 6Depreciationj,t  + β 7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β 8Moral Hazard Indexj,t+β 9 
Concentrationj,t+  β 10  Regulatory measuresj,t+  ε j,t. The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if 
there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Terms of trade equals the change 
in the terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of 
inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit 
growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral 
hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. The aforementioned variables 
are used in analysis but not shown for the sake of brevity.  Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three 
largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the Bankscope database of Fitch IBCA.  
Fraction of entry applications denied measures the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the total applications 
received.  Activity restrictions measures the degree to which banks are restricted from engaging in business of securities 
underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and from real estate investment, management, and development.  Required 
reserves is the percentage of reserves regulators require banks to hold.  Capital regulatory index is a summary measure of capital 
stringency. Banking freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking system.  Economic freedom is a composite 
measure of institutional factors determining economic freedom.  KKZ_composite is a composite measure of governance 
indicators.  White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and 
sources are given in the data appendix, available on request. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Concentration  -0.0402*  -0.0388*  -0.0492** -0.0483** -0.0568** -0.0584** -0.0523** -0.0564** 
  (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0246) (0.0224) (0.0253) (0.0267) (0.0243) (0.0249) 
Fraction of Entry 
Applications  0 . 0 3 4 5 * * *          
  ( 0 . 0 1 2 7 )          
Activity Restrictions    0 . 0 0 3 7 * *         
    ( 0 . 0 0 1 4 )         
Required Reserves     0 . 0 0 0 3        
     ( 0 . 0 0 0 3 )        
Capital  Regulatory  Index      -0.0016      
      ( 0 . 0 0 2 7 )       
Banking  Freedom       -0.0164***     -0.0121* 
       (0.0058)     (0.0071) 
Economic  Freedom        -0.0185**    
        ( 0 . 0 0 8 1 )     
KKZ_composite         -0.0153**  -0.0100 
         (0.0067)  (0.0084) 
No. of Crises  21 34 27 33 47 47 47 47 
No. of Observations  583 767 572 755 955 955 989 955 
%  crises correct  67 74 67 70 68 66 68 70 
%  correct  77 75 78 73 69 70 72 69 
Pseudo R
2  0.1854 0.2105 0.2477 0.2031 0.1145 0.1058 0.1106 0.1186 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  33 
 
Table 5.  Banking Crisis, National Characteristics, and Concentration 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t)= α  + β 1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β 2 Terms of trade changej,t + 
β 3 Real interest ratej,t + β 4 Inflation j,t + β 5M2/reservesj,t + β 6Depreciationj,t  + β 7 Credit growthj,t-2 +β 8 Moral hazard indexj,t + β 9 
Concentrationj,t + β 10  Historical Determinants,t+  ε j,t. The dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if 
there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Terms of trade equals the change 
in the terms of trade of goods and services. Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of 
inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit 
growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral 
hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. The aforementioned variables 
are used in analysis but not shown for the sake of brevity.  Concentration is calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three 
largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the Bankscope database of Fitch IBCA. 
Legal origin includes the three dummies UK, France and Germany, which take the value 1 for each legal origin respectively.  
Latitude is the absolute value of the latitude of each country normalized to lie between zero and one.  Religion includes three 
variables, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant which indicate the percentage of the population that follows a particular religion.  Ethnic 
Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will not speak the same language.  White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the 
data appendix, available on request. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Concentration  -0.0737*** -0.0523** -0.0789*** -0.0579** -0.0845*** 
  (0.0257) (0.0242) (0.0248) (0.0270) (0.0246) 
Common Legal Origin  -.0504**        -0.0643* 
  (0.0211)      (0.0384) 
French Legal Origin  -.0811**        -0.0854 
  (0.0338)      (0.0722) 
German Legal Origin  -.0289***        -.0318*** 
  (0.0084)      (0.0086) 
Latitude   -0.0444     -.0831** 
   (0.0350)    (0.0332) 
Catholic     -.0004**   -0.000* 
     (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Muslim     -0.0001  0.0000 
     (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Protestant     0.0001    -0.0002 
     (0.0003)  (0.0004) 
Ethnic  Fractionalization      0.0184  -0.0036 
      (0.0197)  (0.0181) 
No.  of  Crises  47 47 47 47 47 
No.  of  Observations  989 989 989 974 974 
%    crises  correct  64 70 68 68 72 
%    correct  71 74 72 73 71 
Pseudo R
2  0.1318 0.1174 0.1339 0.1147 0.1583 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  
 
 
 